


# Avian Influenza and Biosecurity

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Global Technical Service – Veterinary Specialist  
H&N International GmbH

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## TAXONOMICAL CLASSIFICATION

-	Realm: <i>Riboviria</i>
-	Kingdom: <i>Orthornavirae</i> Realm: <i>Riboviria</i>
+	Phylum: <i>Duplornaviricota</i> Kingdom: <i>Orthornavirae</i>
+	Phylum: <i>Kitrinoviricota</i> Kingdom: <i>Orthornavirae</i>
+	Phylum: <i>Lenarviricota</i> Kingdom: <i>Orthornavirae</i>
-	Phylum: <i>Negarnaviricota</i> Kingdom: <i>Orthornavirae</i>
-	Subphylum: <i>Haploviricotina</i> Phylum: <i>Negarnaviricota</i>
+	Class: <i>Chunqujviricetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Haploviricotina</i>
+	Class: <i>Milnevircetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Haploviricotina</i>
+	Class: <i>Monjivircetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Haploviricotina</i>
+	Class: <i>Yunchangviricetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Haploviricotina</i>
-	Subphylum: <i>Polyplaviricotina</i> Phylum: <i>Negarnaviricota</i>
+	Class: <i>Eliovircetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Polyplaviricotina</i>
-	Class: <i>Insthovircetes</i> Subphylum: <i>Polyplaviricotina</i>
-	Order: <i>Articulavirales</i> Class: <i>Insthovircetes</i>
+	Family: <i>Amnoonviridae</i> Order: <i>Articulavirales</i>
-	Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i> Order: <i>Articulavirales</i>
-	Genus: <i>Alphainfluenzavirus</i> Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i>
	Species: <i>Alphainfluenzavirus influenzae</i> Genus: <i>Alphainfluenzavirus</i>
+	Genus: <i>Betainfluenzavirus</i> Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i>
+	Genus: <i>Deltainfluenzavirus</i> Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i>
+	Genus: <i>Gammainfluenzavirus</i> Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i>
+	Genus: <i>Isavirus</i> Family: <i>Orthomyxoviridae</i>



Picture: Wikipedia

**Family:** Orthomyxoviridae  
**Genus:** Alphainfluenzavirus  
**Specie:** Alphainfluenzavirus influenzae







# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

A BREAKAWAY ARTIST...

## Antigenic drift




## Antigenic shift



# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## INFLUENZA IN OTHER SPECIES




Wahlgren 2011

Picture: Wikipedia

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

52 OUTBREAKS SINCE 1963: 7 ACTIVE, 3 ENTRECHTED



Source:  
WOAH 2025

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza


## LINEAGE H5Nx Gs/GD A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-like

It originated from geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996.

High capacity for evolution

High adaptability to different birds and mammals


5 waves reported in recent years



Source:  
Ruopeng 2022

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza


## HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b: EVOLUTION AND WAVES



Source:  
WOAH 2025

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza


## INFECTION ROUTE




# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## SURVEILLANCE IN WILD BIRDS IN EUROPE

Cases in  
Wild birds



Cases in  
poultry




■ A ( Not typed) ■ H5 ■ H5N1 ■ H5N3 ■ H5N5 ■ H5N6 ■ H5N8

Sources:  
EFSA 2025


# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## SURVEILLANCE IN WILD BIRDS IN UNITED STATES



# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## SURVEILLANCE IN WILD BIRDS IN UNITED STATES



# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## MIGRATORY BIRDS FLYWAYS IN NORTH AMERICA



### Spring Migration (Northbound):




Starts as early as February for birds like Red-winged Blackbirds and waterfowl (ducks, geese). By April and May, massive migrations of songbirds and hummingbirds arrive in the northern U.S. and Canada.

### Fall Migration (Southbound):

Begins surprisingly early, with some shorebirds moving in July and many others starting by August. The migration continues through October and into early November for many species.

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## BIRD SPECIES AFFECTED BY ORDERS

	<b>Anseriformes</b> Total 100 New* +47		<b>Charadriiformes</b> Total 124 New* +90		<b>Passeriformes</b> Total 65 New* +34
	<b>Gaviiformes</b> Total 4 New* +4		<b>Galliformes</b> Total 18 New* +8		<b>Accipitriformes</b> Total 59 New* +38
	<b>Sphenisciformes</b> Total 8 New* +6		<b>Pelecaniformes</b> Total 35 New* +15		<b>Psittaciformes</b> Total 25 New* +10
	<b>Procellariiformes</b> Total 18 New* +18		<b>Suliformes</b> Total 28 New* +18		<b>Falconiformes</b> Total 13 New* +8
	<b>Gruiformes</b> Total 16 New* +7		<b>Columbiformes</b> Total 9 New* +4		<b>Podicipediformes</b> Total 8 New* +5

\* New species of affected birds by HPAI H5Nx since 2021


Update:

9/21/2025



Source:  
FAO 2025

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b: INFECTIONS IN PHEASANTS AND CHICKENS



Viral excretion



Source:  
Liang 2022

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## HPAI H5N1: DOMESTIC BIRD SPECIES AFFECTED



**Gallus gallus**  
(Chicken)



**Meleagris gallopavo**  
(Turkey)



**Anas platyrhynchos**  
(Duck)



**Anserinae sp.**  
(Goose)



**Numida meleagris**  
(Guinea fowl)



**Phasianus colchicus**  
(Common pheasant)



**Coturnix coturnix**  
(Common quail)



**Columba livia**  
(Domestic pigeon)

### Others:

- **Pavo cristatus**  
(Peacock)
- **Struthio camelus**  
(ostrich)
- **Colinus virginianus**  
(Northern quail)
- **Coturnix japonica**  
(Japanese quail)
- **Dromaius novaehollandiae**  
(Emu)

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## OUTBREAK SITUATION IN UNITED STATES



### HPAI Confirmed Detections in Commercial and Backyard Flocks

as of March 31, 2026 Last reported detection Monday, March 30, 2026  
Data updated weekdays by 12 PM (ET)

[Download Data](#)

#### Outbreak Situation Last 30 Days

**69 Confirmed Flocks**


Flocks tested and confirmed having HPAI

Commercial Flocks	Backyard Flocks	Birds Affected*
<b>37</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>5.22M</b>

\*Number of birds on confirmed infected premises.


#### Detections by Month-Year

Bars reflect most recent 4 months.



#### Commercial Flocks by State

Choose variable: Commercial Flocks | Choose time period: Last 30 Days | Legend: 0 to 24



[Click For International Exports](#)

Source:  
USDA 2025

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## ROLE OF BACKYARD BIRDS




(Bavinck et al., 2009).

**HPAI H7N7 (Netherlands, 2004 )**  
Backyard flocks played a marginal role in the spread of diseases



(Tiensin et al., 2005)

**HPAI H5N1 (Thailand, 2004)**  
Backyard flocks (chickens and ducks) played an important role in the epidemic.




(Souvestre et al., 2019)


**HPAI H5N8 (France, 2017 )**  
Backyard flocks played a minor role in the spread of the disease if biosecurity errors did not occur.

# Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

## HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b IN COWS



First case reported in March 2024  
1073 cases in 17 states (10/09/2025)




Source:  
CDC 2025

# AND ... WHAT DO WE DO NOW?



RESISTANCE  
IS FUTILE,  
MY YOUNG  
DUCKAWAN

# Avian Influenza Control Programs



# Avian Influenza Control Programs

## STRATEGY #1: VIGILANCE + STAMPING OUT

Countries using this strategy:



Education

++

Biosecurity

++

Diagnosis and Surveillance

++

Stamping out

++

Vaccine

-

- It allows the country to regain AI-free status.
- Prevents the spread of a disease in the country.
- Expensive and needs a legal framework.
- Needs prior preparation to be implemented correctly

# Avian Influenza Control Programs

## STRATEGY #2: VACCINATION ONLY

Countries using this strategy:



Education

+/-

Biosecurity

+/-

Diagnosis and Surveillance

-

Stamping out

-

Vaccine

+++

- Reducing losses due to the disease

- Quick and easy deployment

- The disease remains endemic

- Export bans

# Avian Influenza Control Programs

## STRATEGY #3: SURVEILLANCE + STAMPING OUT + VACCINE

Countries using this strategy:



(Only in ducks)



(In the past)



Education

++

Biosecurity

++

Diagnosis and  
Surveillance

+++

Stamping out

+

Vaccine

+

- Use all available means for control

- Prevents the spread of a disease in the country.

- Extremely expensive and difficult to implement.

- Export bans ?


# Understanding Biosecurity

## A CLEAR DEFINITION

A set of **management and physical measures** designed to reduce the risk of **introduction, establishment and spread** of animal **diseases, infections or infestations** to, from and within an **animal population**.


WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code

# H&N Biosecurity Concept



# Epidemiology

## TRANSMISSION FROM MIGRATORY BIRDS



# Bioseguridad

## TOXIC RELATIONSHIPS



# Biosecurity

## WILD BIRDS: THE FLYING RODENTS ( EVEN WORSE)



Poultry houses  
MUST be bird-proof




Do not attract birds  
by feed spillage or  
others



Do not allow birds to  
nest in your premises

# Biosecurity

## DUCK WARS: A NEW HOPE?



Source:  
Armin 2021

# Biosecurity

## WATER: HOME SWEET HOME FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS


Persistence of a H5N1 HPAIV strain at the dose  $10^4$  TCID<sub>50</sub>/ml in different types of water

	Distilled	Pond	River mouth	Seawater
4°C	> 60 days	> 60 days	> 60 days	>60 days
10°C	> 60 days	38 days	42 days	42 days
20°C	> 60 days	21 days	32 days	60 days

Source:  
Domanska-  
Blicharz  
2010

# Biosecurity

## WATER SOURCE REALLY MATERS



1. Surface waters

2. Well

3. Public water network

Microbiological quality

Chemical Quality

Pre-treatment

# Biosecurity

DO NOT FORGET ABOUT YOUR WATER RESERVOIR




## Bird-proof water tank is a **MUST**

- Closed water tank
- No holes or crevices
- Mesh-protected overflow pipe
- Anti-perch spikes installed
- Clean perimeter
- Regular Inspection Routine


# Biosecurity

WATER SANITATION IS ALSO A MUST IN ANY CASE

**Farm 1** Public network water  
No treatment @ farm



**Farm 2** Well water  
Chlorine @ farm



Collection point

End of the pipeline

# Biosecurity

## EVAPORATIVE COOLING SYSTEM ALSO USE WATER



### Keep the cooling system clean and clear of birds

- No water leakage
- No puddles in the surrounding area
- Use a netting covers (mesh size  $\leq 2$  cm)
- Keep good maintenance

# Biosecurity

## BASIC RULES FOR POULTRY WORKERS



No visit to other farms.



No keeping backyard poultry at home.




No bird related hobbies.



# Biosecurity

% change in total bacteria counts in shoe swabs after being footbathed in a hatchery



Source:  
Owen 2006


# Biosecurity

## SANITARY BLOCK / DANISH BARRIER / BENCH SYSTEM

Outside

Anteroom

Henhouse



# Biosecurity

## STAFF NEEDS FOR GOOD BIOSECURITY PRACTICES



**Knowledge**



**Commitment**



**Easy-to-follow**

# Biosecurity

## BIOSECURITY ERRORS WHEN ENTERING AND LEAVING POULTRY HOUSES



**Not respecting the delimitation  
between dirty and clean areas**

**Odds  
ratio**

Footbath VS Bench System

**13.16**

Short visit (< 17m) VS long visit

**2.41**

Observer in the room

**4.61**

**Not signing the logbook**

**Odds  
ratio**

Short visit (< 17m) VS long visit

**5.74**

Observer in the room

**5.70**

# Biosecurity

RODENTS: WE CANNOT COEXIST!



Erysipelas  
(Meerburg 2012)

Salmonellosis  
(Meerburg 2012)


Fowl Cholera  
(Meerburg 2012)

...

**Mechanical  
transmission**

# Biosecurity

## TRANSMISSION FROM INFECTED POULTRY



# Biosecurity


## FARM LOCATION MATTERS



200 m

# Biosecurity

## HPAI TRANSMISSION BY WIND



Molecular surveillance identified identical H5N1 strains among a group of unrelated commercial farms about 8 km away in the Czech Republic.


Main suspicion of the source of infection:

**VIRAL PARTICLES  
CARRIED BY THE WIND**

Source:  
Nagy 2025

# Biosecurity

## SPREAD OF HPAI BY DUST



Amount of contaminated dust present in a square space of 13 ft according to the distance from the source

Some parameters taken into account:

Wind Speed:

12 ft/s

Flock size:

10000 birds

Source:  
Ssematimba  
2012

# Biosecurity

VISITOR POLICY ( The easiest and best to apply )



# Biosecurity


## A DECISION TREE FOR ACCEPTING VISITORS



# Biosecurity

## Detection of Avian Influenza in trucks used for duck farms depopulation during the 2021 HPAI outbreak in France

Detection of the AIV **genome** was carried out by r-RT-PCR for type A influenza virus



	Wheel	Crates	Outside	Cabin
Before C&D protocol	38% n=8	75% n=79	87% n=8	62% n=8
After C&D protocol	12% n=8	29% n=80	22% n=8	38% n=8

Source:  
Huneau-Salaun  
2022

# Biosecurity

THE VEHICLES ARE NOT FOR DRIVING ON THE FARM



External parking




No entrance to all  
avoidable vehicles



Complete disinfection  
for all entering  
vehicles

# Biosecurity

## TOOLS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS STAY OUT



Leave your personal belongings outside...



Disinfect any items before bringing them into the farm.



Stuff coming from other farms **MUST** be rejected

# Biosecurity

DEAD BIRDS ARE NOT A BYPRODUCT  
THEY ARE A BIOLOGICAL RISK

Remove all dead birds  
from the house daily



Store them in a  
correct container




Destroy them totally  
as soon as possible



# Biosecurity

## MANURE IS ALSO HOME SWEET HOME FOR HPAI

Infectivity of H5N1 avian influenza virus in dry and wet manures at 24 and 4°C



Source  
Kurmi 2010

# Biosecurity

MANURE IS A BYPRODUCT  
BUT IT IS STILL A BIOLOGICAL RISK



Remove it from the house as soon as possible



Treat the manure before spreading it on the fields.




Do not spread poultry manure around other poultry houses

# Biosecurity

## THE BIG 3

Average ranking of 21 biosecurity measures for avoiding the introduction on commercial chicken holding with indoor housing




**B:** Prevent direct wild bird contact

**L:** Hygiene lock to production unit

**G:** Restricted access to visitor

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